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We look at how well several alternative Taylor rule specifications de-
scribe Federal Reserve policy decisions in real time, using the newly de-
veloped Giacomini and Rossi (2007) test for non-nested model selection 
in the presence of (possible) parameter instability. Further, we isolate 
those Taylor rule features that are most important for achieving relatively 
strong real-time performance. A second-order partial adjustment version 
of the Koenig (2004a) model performs consistently better than alternative 
specifications. Key features of this rule are the partial adjustment of the 
federal funds rate toward an equilibrium rate that depends on the unem-
ployment rate and forward-looking inflation measures.
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onetary policy prescriptions can be either instrument rules or tar-
geting rules. Instrument rules specify the value of the central bank’s 
policy instrument (for the United States, either the federal funds rate or 
nonborrowed bank reserves) as a function of observable economic condi-
tions. Targeting rules, in contrast, specify a desired relationship between 
variables over which the monetary authority has only indirect and im-
perfect control. These models call for the monetary authority to adjust 
its policy instrument as necessary to maintain the desired relationship as 
closely as possible.1 Instrument rules are more straightforward to imple-
ment than targeting rules, but they can also be more fragile because the 
economic outcomes delivered by a given instrument rule are often sensi-
tive to small changes in the links between the instrument and the real 
economy. This sensitivity raises the possibility that an instrument rule 
that describes policy choices well over one sample period will perform 
poorly in other periods. 
In this paper, we examine the comparative performance of several 
monetary policy instrument rules, using a test designed precisely for situ-
ations in which there may be parameter instability to which instrument 
rules are vulnerable (Giacomini and Rossi 2007). The rules we test are all 
broadly considered Taylor rules (Taylor 1993; Henderson and McKibbin 
1993). A Taylor rule is an equation prescribing the federal funds rate as a 
function of economic slack, inflation, and possibly other variables. A rule 
of this general form describing Federal Reserve policy is intuitively plau-
sible. The Fed has a dual mandate to seek full employment and price sta-
bility, and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has formulated 
policy in terms of the federal funds rate for almost twenty-five years. We 
start by presenting the several commonly used versions of the Taylor rule 
that are examined empirically in this paper. Next, we review the Giaco-
mini and Rossi methodology. The core of the paper is Section 3, in which 
we use the Giacomini–Rossi test to compare the different rules’ ability to 
explain the behavior of the federal funds rate over the last twenty years 
and try to identify the specific features that are most important for suc-
cessful performance. 
Many real-world economic data are subject to ex post revisions. Revi-
sions can be substantial and, for some important variables, extend back 
many years. They are problematic because economic relationships some-
times look very different using final data than they do in first-release or 
once-revised data. For our performance comparison to be meaningful, it is 
essential that the data used for estimation of each policy rule be limited 
to what would have been available to a policymaker or economic analyst 
at the time the policy decisions were made (Orphanides 2001, 2003). We 
use such real-time data throughout our analysis.
Results suggest that gradualism—a tendency to avoid large, sudden 
1 Simple examples of targeting rules include: (1) Milton Friedman’s prescription for 
constant growth of a broad monetary aggregate (Friedman 1960); (2) rules that call for 
constant growth in nominal gross domestic product (nominal GDP) or some other measure 
of nominal spending (Bean 1983; Hall and Mankiw 1994); (3) rules that call for a constant 














































moves in the funds rate—should be included in the Taylor rule for optimal 
descriptive performance, while preemption—responding to forecasts of in-
flation and slack rather than to past and current measures—is important 
for inflation measures but not for slack. Also, we find that the unemploy-
ment gap seems to be a better measure of current economic slack than the 
output gap and that the Blue Chip inflation forecast (as used in Koenig 
2004a) is a better measure of inflation expectations than the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters’ inflation forecast.2
1. TAYLOR RULES
The Original Taylor Rule






where it, πt, yt, and y*  are the overnight lending rate, GDP inflation, (logs 
of) real GDP, and a measure of trend or potential real GDP, respectively; 
where r*  and πT are the equilibrium real interest rate and the Fed’s im-
plicit long-run inflation target (both assumed to be 2 percent); where 
µ≡r*−δπT is a constant term that combines parameters that are not 
separately identifiable from estimation of the Taylor rule alone; and where 
δ and w are parameters that measure the strength of the Fed’s response 
to deviations of inflation from target and of output from potential. Given 
the Fed’s mandate to promote both price stability and full resource uti-
lization, one would expect to find δ, w>0 so that the Fed drives the real 
funds rate (it−πt) above the equilibrium real rate (making policy “tight”) 
when inflation is unacceptably high and/or output is unsustainably high. 
Approximate and sometimes exact forms of these rules are the best option 
under the assumption that a central bank has a quadratic loss function 
over inflation and output gap and the variability of short-term interest 
rates. (See Svensson 1999 and Woodford 2001, among others.)
Variants and Extensions
The original Taylor rule has several potential weaknesses. First, there 
is ambiguity about how best to measure inflation. The original Taylor 
rule used the GDP deflator for this purpose, but there is no compelling 
theoretical argument for policymakers to prefer this measure to, for ex-
ample, the deflator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). On 
grounds of practicality, one can also make a case for the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). It is familiar to the public, available with only a small delay, 
and—unlike the GDP and PCE deflators—is not subject to large ex post 
2 Koenig uses the Blue Chip Economic Indicators consensus forecast of CPI inflation 














































revisions when expenditure weights are updated. Then there is the ques-
tion of whether it is best to use the all-inclusive headline inflation number 
or a core inflation rate that excludes certain goods and services. It is not 
always obvious which inflation measure policymakers choose to watch, and 
there is no guarantee that their choice will not change over time.
The ambiguity about how to measure economic slack for policy pur-
poses is at least as great as that for inflation statistics. The potential-
output variable that is the key to calculating output gap in the original 
Taylor rule is notoriously difficult to estimate, particularly in real time 
(Mishkin 2007; Wynne and Solomon 2007; Solow and Taylor 2001; Or-
phanides and van Norden 2005; van Norden 1995; Cayen and van Norden 
2005; Watson 2007). Measures of economic slack based on the unemploy-
ment rate have been developed, but they remain controversial. Typically, 
they involve comparing the actual unemployment rate to an estimate of 
the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, which is 
not directly observed. Solow notes that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the unemployment rate corresponds to about 1.25 million jobs (equivalent 
to about a 2 percent increase in GDP), concluding that small errors in 
policymakers’ estimates of the NAIRU can have huge economic implica-
tions (Solow and Taylor 2001). It is sobering, then, that Staiger, Stock, 
and Watson (1997) estimate that a typical 95 percent confidence interval 
for the NAIRU is on the order of 2.5 percentage points wide. Here, again, 
the exact variable that policymakers monitor is ambiguous, their choice 
may change over time, and the use of real-time data is critical.
Another issue relates to the speed with which the Fed adjusts its 
policy instrument in response to new information on inflation and slack. 
Researchers have found that the Federal Reserve tends to move incre-
mentally, in a series of small or moderate steps in the same direction—a 
process called interest rate smoothing, or gradualism. Gradualism is a 
way to exercise caution in policymaking because it allows policymakers 
to assess their approach and make adjustments if necessary. It is usually 
modeled by including one or more lagged values of the federal funds rate 
as right-hand-side variables in the Taylor rule equation. The greater the 
combined weight on the lagged funds rates, the more drawn out are policy 
responses.
Some of what appears to be gradualism may actually be a symptom 
of misspecification (Rudebusch 2006; Lansing 2002; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy 
2008). That is, policy decisions in part could be based on slowly moving 
economic variables that the analyst has mistakenly excluded from the 
right-hand side of the Taylor rule. In some countries, for example, policy 
appears to depend on exchange rates in addition to inflation and slack 
(Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1998; Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and 
Papell 2007; Gerberding, Seitz, and Worms 2005). In the United States, 
however, evidence of exchange rate effects is weak. Analysts have had bet-
ter luck with measures of output growth and changes in slack (Orphanides 
2003; Koenig 2004a). Another potentially excluded variable is a measure 
of expectations. Given the long lags with which policy actions are thought 
to be reflected in real activity and inflation, it may make sense for poli-














































inflation than current levels (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1998; Galí and 
Gertler 2000; Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000; Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-
Salido 2001). It certainly is not uncommon to hear policymakers talk of 
preemptive action to prevent building inflation pressures from manifest-
ing themselves as actual increases in inflation. Orphanides (2003) cites 
the statement from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ first annual 
report, from 1914, which says that a Reserve Bank’s duty “is not to await 
emergencies but by anticipation, to do what it can to prevent them.” Thus, 
to control inflation, the policy instrument should respond to deviations of 
the inflation forecast from the target (Taylor and Davradakis 2006).
The models included in our analysis span the evolution of the Taylor 
rule, including its most representative variants and extensions. We chose 
models with different measures of inflation and slack, different speeds 
of adjustment, and preemptive versus reactive policies. To emulate the 
policymaker’s situation, we use real-time data in all of the models, imply-
ing a one-quarter lag (the time it takes for initial data releases). We use 
real-time quarterly data from the first quarter of 1988 to the first quarter 
of 2006.3
We begin by defining a general model that encompasses the tradi-
tional backward-looking Taylor rule in Table 1. Since the first three mod-
els can be expressed as special cases of Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, 
and Papell (2007), or MNRP, we use MNRP as a baseline to test the 
validity of its distinctive elements. These include using deviation of GDP 
from a quadratic trend as the measure of current slack, first-order partial 
Table 1: Traditional Backward-Looking Taylor Models
Monetary rule Description
Taylor (1993) it=µ+(1+δ)πt+ wy ^
t
Inflation: Current GDP deflator
Current slack: Deviation of GDP from a linear time trend
Inflation (δ) and GDP gap (w) coefficients fixed at 0.5
Taylor A it=(1−ρ){µ+(1+0.5)πt+0.5y ^
t}+ρit–1
Defined as above with first-order partial adjustment
Taylor B it=µ+(1+δ)πt+ wy ^
t
Defined as Taylor (1993) with estimated inflation (δ) and GDP 
gap (w) coefficients
MNRP (2007) it=(1−ρ){µ+(1+δ)πt+wy ^
t}+ρit–1
Inflation: Year-over-year percent change in the GDP deflator
Current slack: Deviation of real GDP from a quadratic time trend
First-order partial adjustment
NOTES: Model descriptions are not as authors originally specified. Some were modified to 
adhere to the strict use of real-time data. The MNRP model is only one backward-looking 
specification considered in Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2007). Refer to the 
original papers for details.














































adjustment, and estimated (rather than a priori) coefficients. We conduct 
a nonlinear least-squares estimation (NLLS) with HAC standard errors 
for the entire sample, as well as rolling and recursive regressions with a 
thirty-two quarter (eight-year) window. The adjusted R-squared values for 
the overall sample, presented in Table 2, slightly favor the MNRP slack 
variable and the use of one lagged funds rate. Using deviations from linear 
GDP trend slightly lowers the overall goodness of fit of the model from 
0.9483 to 0.9472, not a very meaningful difference. In contrast, first-order 
partial adjustment increases performance from 0.5540 (no lags) to 0.9483 
(one lag). With a priori fixed coefficients, the results are puzzling because 
the fit is almost the same as in the original MNRP model. However, in the 
rolling and recursive regressions in Figure 1, it is clear that using overall 
average measures of fit obscures variation in the fit values over time, which 
suggests that the original MNRP definition is the most accurate general-
ized representation of the backward-looking models considered.
With MNRP as our generalized reactive rule, we make a broader com-
parison, adding to the analysis two widely cited preemptive models, Clari-
da, Galí, and Gertler (1998), or CGG, and Koenig (2004a), or Koenig.
Table 2: MNRP vs. Taylor Models
BIC Adjusted R2





GDP linear detrending 1.7053 .9472
No lags 3.7950 .5540
Fixed coefficients 1.5813 .9490
NOTES: NLLS  estimates  of  it=(1−ρ){µ+(1+δ)πt+wy ^
t}+ρit–1 with  Newey–West  HAC                                                                                                                                                                         
standard errors. Refer to Table 1 for variables definitions. Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) is defined as follows: BIC = –2lnL + kln(n), where L is the likelihood function, k is the 
number of free parameters, and n is the sample size.
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t+f are the inflation rate 
and slack that policymakers expect f periods hence; where 0≤ρ1+ρ2<1; 
β, w≥0; and δ>0. However, each model imposes different restrictions on 
the parameters in equation 3 and uses different measures of inflation and 
slack.4
In  the  original  version,  the  restrictions  for  the  MNRP  model  are 
ρ2=β=f =0; for CGG, β=0 and f =4; and for Koenig, ρ2=0 and f =4. 
An obvious distinction between the CGG model and MNRP and Koenig is 
the presence of a second-order partial adjustment in the first model. Given 
the evidence presented in CGG supporting the use of two lagged values of 
the federal funds rate, we test whether these models behave better with 
first- or second-order partial adjustment. We conduct a NLLS estimation 
for the whole sample, as well as rolling and recursive regressions with a 
thirty-two quarter (eight-year) window for each model, comparing the re-
sults for one and two lags. The NLLS results (Table 3) show that our three 
real-time models are slightly better specified, on average, with two federal 
funds lags. These results are supported by the goodness-of-fit estimations 
for the rolling and recursive regressions, which all favor the use of two lags. 
So, we include two lags in all our real-time rules.
Table 3: First- vs. Second-Order Partial Adjustment Coefficients
Overall regression One lag (ρ) Two lags (ρ1/ρ2)
MNRP Coefficient .9530   1.5898 / –.6372
Std error .0533   .1139 /  .1031
t statistic 17.8527   13.9476 /  –6.1803
p value .0000   .0000 /  .0000
Adjusted R2 .9483 .9683
CGG Coefficient .7639   1.3511 / –.5127
Std error .0554   .1125 /  .1018
t statistic 13.7912   12.0081 /  –5.0350
p value .0000   .0000 /  .0000
Adjusted R2 0.9623 .9725
Koenig Coefficient .7237   1.1941 / –.4192
Std error  .6999   .1346 /  .1024
t statistic 10.3411   8.8691 /  –4.0952
p value .0000   .0000 /  .0001
Adjusted R2 .9699 .9765
NOTE: NLLS estimates with Newey–West HAC standard errors.














































Table 4 shows the second-order partial adjustment definitions for the 
models, along with their parameter restrictions. Figure 2 shows the good-
ness of fit of these partially modified rules. While on the whole, the models 
poorly in 2001–02, when the funds rate was cut by over 5 percentage 
points in response to the dot-com bust and 9/11 attacks. We believe this 
irregularity is due to the fact that the Fed reacts to information not cap-
tured by any of these models. Moreover, it does not react in a mechanical 
way.
Table 4: Taylor Rules Examined











With second-order partial adjustment: β=f =0
Backward looking
Inflation: Year-over-year percent change in the GDP deflator





With second-order partial adjustment: β=0, f=4
Forward looking
Inflation: Blue Chip four-quarter GDP price inflation forecast*




With second-order partial adjustment: f=4
Forward looking
Inflation: Blue Chip inflation forecast (uses CPI until 1998 and 
GDP deflator from 1999 on)
Current slack: Difference between the current and natural rates 
of unemployment**
Anticipated change in slack: Difference between the Blue Chip 
GDP growth forecast and a five-year average of the GDP growth 
rate
* Originally, authors used actual future one-year-hence inflation as a measure of expected 
inflation; we substitute to preserve the real-time nature of the analysis. 
**  Unemployment  gap  is  defined  as  the  current  unemployment  rate  minus  the  moving 
average of the unemployment rate for the previous five years, as in Kim and Ogaki (2008). 
This specification makes its sign consistent with that of the conventional output gap.
NOTES: Model descriptions are not as authors originally specified. Some were modified to 
adhere to the strict use of real-time data. Refer to the original papers for details.
The goodness-of-fit test gives us an idea of how the models perform in-
dependently, but it does not tell us how they compare with each other, which 
is a more interesting question and a more relevant one from a policymaking 
perspective. Models may not be correctly specified, their parameters may 
not be stable over time, and the measures of inflation, output, and unem-
ployment that feed into the rules may not be accurately estimated. These 














































Figure 2: Evolution of Goodness-of-Fit R2 for First- vs. Second-Order 








  MNRP 1 lag  MNRP 2 lags  CGG 1 lag  CGG 2 lags  Koenig 1 lag  Koenig 2 lags
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NOTE: For model descriptions, refer to Table 4.
2. METHODOLOGY
Instrument rules in general may be fragile in that the economic out-
comes they predict are often sensitive to small changes in links between 
the instrument and the real economy. This raises the possibility that an 
instrument rule that well describes policy choices in one sample period will 
perform poorly in others. This important issue is ignored by traditional 
non-nested model selection techniques, which evaluate models based on 
how well they fit the full sample of data or whether they forecast better 
on average.
The possibility that structural instability and model misspecification 
may hide time-varying differences has important implications in policy-
making, and it had not been formally considered until recently, in the 
Giacomini–Rossi (2007) fluctuation test for non-nested model selection 
in unstable environments. We apply this technique to evaluate the per-
formance of our three models; it allows us to monitor the relative per-
formance of two competing models at every time period, in sequences of 
test statistics over expanding and rolling samples. The test also provides 
confidence-interval boundary lines under the null hypothesis that both 
models perform equally well in every period. Therefore, instability is de-
tected when any of the test statistics cross the boundary lines.
Our objective is to select, among the three real-time models in Ta-
ble 4, the Taylor rule version that best describes the historical behavior of 
the federal funds rate, it. The models use a variety of measures of current 
and expected inflation and output, and all incorporate two lags of the fed-
eral funds rate. We denote these variables as zt and define xt=(i′ t, z′ t)′  . For 
details on the variables used in these models, refer to Appendix A.5 For 
any pair of competing models, we recursively obtain the maximum likeli-
hood (ML) estimates at each time t and use them to construct statistics 
for the Giacomini–Rossi test.
5 Notation and the majority of derivation are taken directly from Giacomini and Rossi 














































The in-sample fluctuation test is performed by examining historical sample 
data from time t=1(first quarter 1988) to t =T=73 (first quarter 2006). The 
values of objective functions Qt  for models 1 and 2 are calculated recursively 
beginning with observation R = 32 (for an eight-year window), using both 
expanding samples of sizes R,R+1, …,T−1, T and rolling samples of size R:
















1 Qt(γ �)=  lnf(xj,γ �






where parameters θ(p×1)∈Θ for model 1 and γ(q×1)∈Γ for model 2, 
and
(4) θ ^
t= arg max Qt(θ) and γ ^
t= arg max Qt(γ).
Here, lnf (xj, θ ^
t) and lnf (xj, γ ^
t) are the conditional log likelihoods 
at time j for models 1 and 2, respectively.6 Denoting θ*
t and γ*
t as the 
pseudo-true values of the parameter estimates (which may differ in differ-





t)=0 for all t =1,…,T by considering a sequence of 
recursive estimates of the average relative performance of Qt(θ ^
t)−Qt(γ ^
t)
for t =R,…,T. The starting period is t =R=32 (eight years), and at 
each time t, we further normalize the average relative performance by its 
standard deviation, or the square root of the variance σ ^2
t of the rescaled 
relative fit, which is evaluated at the pseudo-true values of the parameter 
estimates as follows:7
(5) σθ γ tt tt t vart QQ 2 =− () (()( )) ** .










–1    t(Qt(θ �
t)–Qt(γ �))  .
The sample path of the recursively estimated measures tells us about 
6 It is assumed that the data-generating process is unknown and allowed to vary over 
time and that data are weakly dependent.
7 For details on the derivation of the variance estimator σ ^2














































their performance over time.8 The procedure allows us to test whether 
this observed path departs from the hypothesized path by plotting them 
together with boundary lines that are crossed with probability α. For the 
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where k corresponds to the values for a 10 percent confidence interval, 
2.600 and 0.850 for the rolling and recursive estimations, respectively.9
3. RESULTS
Model Comparison
We start by comparing the performance of Koenig to that of the other 
two rules. Figure 3 presents the results of the Giacomini–Rossi rolling 
and recursive tests and shows the 10 percent critical bands (shaded area).
Figure 3: Results of Rolling and Recursive Giacomini–Rossi (2007) Tests 
  K-CGG  K-MNRP 




















NOTE: Baseline model is modified Koenig, which uses Blue Chip inflation forecast and 
unemployment for current slack.
Values above the upper band mean that the base model performs better 
8 Traditional non-nested model selection techniques determine performance based on 
overall averages for the entire sample, which would correspond to the last point in the 
Giacomini–Rossi test. So, if a policymaker were to select a model in this context, he or she 
would do it by looking at the latest overall average. The Giacomini–Rossi test shows the 
sample path of relative performance of the models, which contains more information.
9 The approximate critical value for the rolling test is based on R/T  0.44. We decided 
that a 10 percent confidence interval is more appropriate than the more common 5 percent, 
given the small sample of seventy-two quarters.
The in-sample fluctuation test is performed by examining historical sample 
data from time t=1(first quarter 1988) to t =T=73 (first quarter 2006). The 
values of objective functions Qt  for models 1 and 2 are calculated recursively 
beginning with observation R = 32 (for an eight-year window), using both 
expanding samples of sizes R,R+1, …,T−1, T and rolling samples of size R:
  Rolling  Recursive
Model 1
Model 2
where parameters θ(p×1)∈Θ for model 1 and γ(q×1)∈Γ for model 2, 
and
(4) θ ^
t= arg max Qt(θ) and γ ^
t= arg max Qt(γ).
Here, lnf (xj, θ ^
t) and lnf (xj, γ ^
t) are the conditional log likelihoods 
at time j for models 1 and 2, respectively.6 Denoting θ*
t and γ*
t as the 
pseudo-true values of the parameter estimates (which may differ in differ-





t)=0 for all t =1,…,T by considering a sequence of 
recursive estimates of the average relative performance of Qt(θ ^
t)−Qt(γ ^
t)
for t =R,…,T. The starting period is t =R=32 (eight years), and at 
each time t, we further normalize the average relative performance by its 
standard deviation, or the square root of the variance σ ^2
t of the rescaled 
relative fit, which is evaluated at the pseudo-true values of the parameter 
estimates as follows:7
(5) .
Then  the  statistics,  appropriately  normalized,  are  recursively  esti-
mated as 
(6) .
The sample path of the recursively estimated measures tells us about 
6 It is assumed that the data-generating process is unknown and allowed to vary over 
time and that data are weakly dependent.
7 For details on the derivation of the variance estimator σ ^2














































than the competing model, values within the bands mean that the mod-
els perform equally well, and values below the lower band mean that the 
competing model outperforms the base model.
In the recursive test, Koenig is superior to MNRP at every point in 
time, except for a couple of quarters at the end of 2000, when both models 
perform equally well. Koenig is also superior to CGG before 2000, al-
though CGG seems to be slightly stronger than MNRP. After 2000, CGG 
and Koenig perform statistically the same. The results of the rolling test 
lead to a similar conclusion, although the superiority of Koenig is not as 
overwhelming as in the recursive regression. MNRP performs about the 
same as Koenig from 1996 to 2004.
Table 5 quantifies the results of both the rolling and recursive tests 
presented in Figure 3. Overall, we see that our baseline model, Koenig, 
outperforms the other models.
Table 5: Giacomini–Rossi Test Results: Rolling and Recursive 
Baseline model: Modified Koenig 
Inflation: Blue Chip forecast 
Slack measure: Unemployment gap
Percentage of time the base 
model outperforms a  
competitor model
Percentage of time a competitor 













Modified MNRP 95.2 28.6 4.8 0
CGG 85.7  9.5 14.3 0
Recursive estimation
Modified Koenig 100.0 90.5 0 0
CGG 100.0 50.0 0 0
NOTE: For model descriptions, refer to Table 4. 
Sensitivity Analysis
Our results suggest that Koenig’s model incorporates elements that 
better depict the actual behavior of the federal funds rate. To further ana-
lyze this model, we tweak it to assess each element’s marginal impact on 
performance. In an NLLS estimation with the entire sample (Table 6), we 
see that the unemployment rate and Blue Chip inflation forecast have high
marginal values. The change in slack provides the least benefit, having a 














































Figure 4 shows the R-squared values of rolling and recursive regres-
sions with a thirty-two quarter window. The rolling version tells the same 
story: The unemployment rate and Blue Chip forecast add most of the 
marginal value and anticipated change in slack adds the least, although it 
is important to note that all the elements have diminished marginal value 
after 2004. As is clearer in the recursive version, the unemployment rate 
and Blue Chip inflation forecast provide most of the model’s explanatory 
power, while anticipated change in slack adds virtually nothing.
Table 6: Modified Koenig: Marginal Value of Its Elements





























with Newey–West HAC standard errors. p values in parentheses. Production slack is defined 
as the difference between the unemployment rate and NAIRU, with positive values corre-
sponding to underproduction. 
Figure 4: Evolution of Goodness-of-Fit R2 for Second-Order Partial 
Adjustment Koenig*
Modiﬁed Koenig  Without unemployment  Without Blue Chip  Without ∆ slack















A. Rolling B. Recursive
*Tweaking one element at a time.
Now we evaluate how a modified version of Koenig’s model performs 
with alternative measures of slack and inflation. We make three interest-
ing comparisons. The first tests different definitions of inflation, notably 
forward-looking inflation measures (CGG and Koenig) versus current real-
time inflation (MNRP). In the second, we test different definitions of slack, 
specifically quadratic deviation from the industrial production trend (CGG) 
and from the GDP trend (MNRP) versus the unemployment rate (Koenig). 















































We begin by assessing the performance of our modified Koenig version 
with different indexes. For inflation, we use the current GDP deflator (as in 
MNRP), and for current slack, we use quadratic deviation from industrial 
production trend (as in CGG) and from real GDP (as in MNRP). We also 
compare these outcomes with and without including anticipated change in 
slack. The results are presented in Table 7. The anticipated change in slack 
is statistically insignificant in all cases, and its addition to goodness of fit is 
minimal overall and negative in some cases. Although the alternative mea-
sures of inflation and current slack are statistically significant, the measures 
used in our modified Koenig model seem to add more to the overall good-
ness of fit.
Figure  5  shows  the  Koenig  version’s  performance  with  alternative 
measures of inflation and slack over time. The rolling version shows that 
most of the time, Koenig’s model performs better; however, we see that 
in some periods, using quadratic deviation of industrial production as a 
measure of current slack adds value to the fit. After 2003, the GDP defla-
tor seems to be slightly better than the Blue Chip inflation forecast. The 
recursive estimation clearly favors the baseline measure, although the alt-
ernative quadratic definition of GDP is superior around 2000. Once again, 
anticipated change in slack contributes almost nothing.
Table 7: Modified Koenig with Competitor Models’ Measures of  
Inflation and Slack























































with Newey–West HAC standard errors. p values in parentheses. For “modified Koenig” and 
“with GDP deflator,” production slack is defined as the difference between the unemploy-
ment rate and NAIRU, with positive values corresponding to underproduction. For “with 
GDP quadratic trend deviation” and “with IP quadratic trend deviation,” production slack 
is defined as the difference between output and its potential, with positive values correspond-














































Figure 5: Evolution of Goodness-of-Fit R2 for Modified Koenig with 
Alternative Measures of Inflation and Slack















Modiﬁed Koenig  GDP quadratic  IP quadratic  GDP deﬂator
A. Rolling B. Recursive
Measure Comparison
The evidence so far suggests that our modified Koenig model in a par-
simonious setup (without expected change in slack) and the measures used 
to define it are the most accurate way to explain the federal funds rate. 
We cannot be certain that his model—or any other, for that matter—
is correctly specified or that the variables included are accurately mea-
sured. We do know, however, that monetary policy rules’ performance 
varies as different inflation and output gap statistics are used, so we must 
extend our analysis to statistics other than those in the MNRP and CGG 
models to see if we can find superior alternatives.
Using only real-time data, we compare various measures of inflation 
and the output gap using the Giacomini–Rossi test in the same way we 
compare monetary policy models. We want to identify the most infor-
mative variables to be used in the best Taylor rule possible. With the 
Giacomini–Rossi technique, we test the in-sample performance of different 
inflation and output measures, including those from the models.
For inflation, we compare the CPI, GDP deflator, Blue Chip inflation 
forecast, Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) GDP inflation forecast, 
and M1 and M2 growth.10 For output gap, we compare GDP deviations 
from linear and quadratic time trends, Hodrick–Prescott 1600 filter devia-
tions from real GDP, industrial production deviations from a quadratic 
time trend, and the difference between current and natural rates of unem-
ployment (NAIRU), as used in Koenig.
10 We do not include PCE or core PCE inflation rates because forecasts are essentially 
unavailable (we are interested in real-time forward-looking measures). Other authors seem to 
have had similar problems, including Koenig (2004b), who notes in this article that “historical 
PCE inflation forecasts are not easy to find.” The Survey of Professional Forecasters started 
to ask about PCE inflation expectations only in 2007. To indirectly include this important 
measure, we follow Koenig (2004b) and use forecasts of the GDP deflator after 1999, when 
Fed policymakers presumably shifted their attention from CPI to PCE. Koenig uses the 
GDP deflator because, as he notes, “the correlation between GDP and PCE price inflation 














































Figure 6 presents the relative performance (rolling and recursive) of 
the different inflation measures compared with the Blue Chip inflation 
forecast, the measure used in our baseline model (including anticipated 
change in slack), along with the critical 10 percent bands. In the rolling 
regression, the Blue Chip inflation forecast performs better than the GDP 
deflator, SPF inflation forecasts, M1, M2 and CPI at the beginning of the 
sample and equally well after 1997. In the recursive regression, the Blue 
Chip forecast outperforms the GDP deflator, SPF inflation forecast, M1, 
M2 and CPI until 2000 and does equally well afterward. CPI performs as 
well all the time. Thus, the Blue Chip inflation forecast seems to be the 
best measure. These results are very similar when the base model excludes 
the anticipated-change-in-slack term.
Figure 7 presents the results for the output gap measures. In the 
Figure 6: Results of Rolling and Recursive Giacomini–Rossi (2007) Tests 
for Inflation Measures 












GDP deﬂator  M1 growth  M2 growth  SPF deﬂator     CPI












NOTE: Baseline model is modified Koenig, which uses Blue Chip inflation forecast and 
unemployment for current slack.
Figure 7: Results of Rolling and Recursive Giacomini–Rossi (2007) Tests 
for Output Measures 


























GDP quad  GDP linear  HP ﬁlter  IP quad
NOTE: Baseline model is modified Koenig, which uses Blue Chip inflation forecast and 














































rolling regression, all the measures perform equally well most of the time, 
except for brief periods in which Koenig’s measure outperforms the rest. 
Industrial production is the only statistic that ever outperforms Koenig’s 
measure, for three quarters in 1998. The recursive regression favors the 
unemployment rate even more. At the beginning of the sample, Koenig’s 
model performs better than the rest of the measures; after 2000, all the 
measures perform equally well, except for deviation of GDP from a linear 
trend, which falls short of the base measure in nearly the entire sample. 
We obtain similar results when anticipated change in slack is excluded 
from our base model.
Tables 8 (rolling regression) and 9 (recursive regression) present the 
above results for inflation and output measures compared with the base 
models (Blue Chip inflation forcast for inflation and unemployment gap for 
output). In terms of inflation, the Blue Chip inflation forecast is the best, 
followed by SPF (rolling). In both the rolling and recursive regressions, 
the Blue Chip inflation forecast is better almost all the time, and this 
difference is often statistically significant. Among output gap variables, 
the base measure is clearly best, especially in the recursive regression. 
Table 8: Giacomini–Rossi Rolling Test: Relative Performance of Various 
Inflation and Slack Measures
Base measure: Modified Koenig
Percentage of time base 
model outperforms  
competitor model
Percentage of time  
competitor model  
outperforms base model





































































































































































Table 9: Giacomini–Rossi Recursive Test: Relative Performance of  
Various Inflation and Slack Measures
Base measure: Modified Koenig
Percentage of time base 
model outperforms  
competitor model
Percentage of time  
competitor model  
outperforms base model

























































































































Our examination of alternative specifications suggests strongly that to 
describe Federal Reserve funds-rate decisions consistently well, one needs 
to adopt a version of the Taylor rule that includes both gradualism and 
preemption. FOMC members appear to try to avoid sharp changes in the 
target funds rate and to respond to signs of emerging inflation pressures as 
reflected in inflation forecasts. In our examination, we use only real-time 
data—i.e., data that would have been available to the FOMC at the time 
that policy decisions were made. We rely on statistical methodology that 
is appropriate for comparing non-nested models over sample periods dur-
ing which parameter instability is a concern.
Specifically, we find that in quarterly data, descriptive performance is 
best with two lagged values of the target funds rate among the right-hand-
side variables in the Taylor rule rather than with no lagged values or just 
one. Also, Blue Chip inflation expectations seems to be a better measure 
of inflation pressures that concern policymakers than either lagged actual 














































the unemployment rate is a more useful measure of slack in the economy, 
for purposes of explaining monetary policy decisions, than either detrend-
ed real GDP or detrended industrial production. A second-order partial 
















































A. Variables, Sources, and Definitions
Blue Chip CPI inflation forecast: Consensus forecast for the upcoming 
four-quarter period, as published during the third month of the current 
quarter. (Source: Blue Chip professional forecasters.)
Blue Chip GDP forecast: Consensus four-quarter GDP growth forecast. 
(Source: Blue Chip professional forecasters.)
Blue Chip GDP inflation forecast: Consensus forecast for the upcoming 
four-quarter period, as published during the third month of the current 
quarter. (Source: Blue Chip professional forecasters.)
Effective federal funds rate: Monthly average of daily data, percent per 
annum.
GDP deflator: Year-over-year difference in log of price index. (Source: 
Philadelphia Fed.)
Industrial production gap: Industrial production deviation from quadratic 
time trend. Available following month, seasonally adjusted. (Source: Phil-
adelphia Fed.)
M1 growth rate: Log difference. (Source: Philadelphia Fed.)
M2 growth rate: Log difference. (Source: Philadelphia Fed.)
Natural  growth  of  real  GDP:  Five-year  moving  average  of  real  GDP. 
(Source: Authors’ calculations from above.)
Natural unemployment rate: Five-year moving average of unemployment 
rate. (Source: Authors’ calculations from the last available value of the 
unemployment rate, below, published by the Philadelphia Fed.) 
Real GDP gap (HP 1600): Real GDP gap using a Hodrick–Prescott 1600 
filter. (Source: Authors’ calculations from real output, below.)11
Real GDP gap (linear): Real output deviations from a linear time trend. 
(Source: Authors’ calculations from real output, below.)
Real GDP gap (quadratic): Real output deviations from a quadratic time 
trend. (Source: Authors’ calculations from real output, below.)
Real output: Last available value in the middle of the current quarter. 
(Source: Philadelphia Fed.)
11 The HP filter is corrected for its well-known end-of-sample problem by extending the 
series twelve points in both directions using an AR(4) model in growth rates before applying 














































Semi-real-time CPI: Log difference. Data come from fourth quarter 2007, 
shifted by one quarter to reflect the fact that releases of real-time data lag 
one quarter. (Source: Philadelphia Fed.)
SPF inflation forecast: Four-quarter forecast for growth in the GDP defla-
tor, available from SPF_medianGrowth.xls, PGDP sheet. (Source: Survey 
of Professional Forecasters.)
Unemployment rate: Last available value in the middle of the current 
quarter. (Source: Philadelphia Fed.)
 
B. Additional Details on the Giacomini–Rossi (2007) Test
The variance σ ^2
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where S=t  for the recursive case and S =R for the rolling case. {lt} is a 
sequence of integers such that lt→∞ as T→∞, lt=o(T), and {wt,j:t=1,2,…, 
T;  k=1,2,…,lt}  is  a  triangular  array  such  that  |wi,j|<∞,t = 1,2,…, 




Following Newey and West (1987), we set lS t =
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